The stupidity is as much in the things that one does as in those that one says: one does stupid things and one says some. This shows how much stupidity covers. In short, it affects what makes the human being, his specificity, even his excellence: to say it and to act. If we know how much speech distinguishes us from other animal species, it is the same concerning our action: the human being does not only feed, move, reproduce, he takes thoughtful and coordinated gestures, capable of innovation, with a view to an end which he sees as better for himself or his community, that is to say, for something which he sees as a common or personal good, as an excellence, and of which he consciously wants to get closer, by not sparing the means, sought or not, to get there.
But then, one is astonished, how does stupidity make its way into this space of saying and doing, what does intelligence rule, however? Because stupidity surprises and disconcerts each time we witness it or make ourselves the experience, as if we never made it to his show, as recurring as it is. Note that it is otherwise with the error, which consists only in taking the false for the truth: it is hardly surprising, since we know we are fallible (Errare humanum est) — but not unintelligent. It is the same with the error of judgment, which is a lack of discernment because the confusion is always waiting for us. But stupidity, which is not to be confused with idiocy, that is to say, the weak mind of the weak-minded, how does it manage to thwart the mechanisms of intelligence?
The answer would be this: it succeeds because it nests at the heart of certain processes of thought, as advanced by the few thinkers who have studied the question. The stupidity is not due to some external force. to thought and capable of diverting it (like passions or self-interest) or to a relaxation of intellectual capacities, it is immanent in one of the modes of thought: reason itself. How does it look? Without going into the technical details, let’s say, roughly speaking, that this immanence has to do with the ability of reason to stick to a logic of the same (A is A) implacably because insensitive to difference in context. As Alain Roger sums it up: “Reason is, in principle, always capable of excess, because its sufficiency is, at least virtually, part of its own logic”. Stupidity, therefore, does not result from a deficiency or a deficiency, but an excess. This excess amounts to excessive use of tautological formulas. For example, consider an administrative rule that says that every employee assigned to customer service in a certain company is entitled to a computer provided by the employer. The context is as follows: K, an employee of this service is considering doing the same work for the company, but as a self-employed person paid by this company; he asked his supervisor if he could, under these new conditions, keep his computer, which is, after all, his main working tool. Immediate and firm response from the superior: no, since K will no longer be considered an employee of this service. We understand that logically K, as a self-employed worker, does not have the same status as anyone who is employed by the company: in other words, a self-employed worker is a self-employed worker (A is A), or even, who does is not an employee. Relentless logic but insensitive to the difference that the present context brings.
FROM IMMANENCE TO TELOS
If this hypothesis of immanence seems to be a good way to define the notion of stupidity, I do not believe that it is the only one, to the extent that it is difficult for me to admit that stupidity can be reduced to the only relentless logic of the same. It seems to me that we must also consider the reason why thought can be the breeding ground for stupidity in saying and doing it. Even if it is thought that itself generates stupidity by the way of reason, it remains to understand how exactly stupidity can be maintained or even multiply there. I give the following answer: it is for as much as one starts in action towards a goal. More precisely, where we find stupidity, it would be, for a significant part, in this effort that we put to pursue ends. It is this hypothesis that I want to examine here. And this is probably not the only other possibility to have a more complete portrait of stupidity. Because I suspect that no final touch can be made to this portrait.
In other words, it is not by multiplying the actions and the words that one runs the greatest risk of making nonsense and saying it — which would be statistically probable and logical -, but it would be by force to pursue this and that or to stay in this or that moment. The nuance is important. It shows that stupidity is not limited to a stubborn, limited attitude, a resistance of thought, or to the stupidity due to spontaneity, which can be quickly realized (“Oh, I just said / to do something stupid”). The stupidity would also be in a certain dash of the thought which seeks to maintain the same course cost-that-cost, as much in the saying (in particular at the level of the writing and the distancing which it is supposed to bring) that in doing it in the more or less long term. Let’s go back to the example of the employee in customer service: isn’t the stupidity of his superior seen above all in the effort he puts into respecting a rule? I say “respect a rule”, not defend it. Because, in this case, the attitude of the superior does not lie in a debate on the merits of the administrative rule. His attitude is more like that which every good citizen has towards the law: he respects it, he honors it. And it is from this perspective that we can read a form of stupidity in the attitude of the superior: he makes it a point of honor to respect the rule without suspecting that the situation presents a peculiarity that encourages reflection or least delay the time to decide. All the efforts which he devotes to the problem submitted aim only at respecting the rule in force.
The hypothesis which I advance here and which I call “hypothesis of the telos” has the merit, in spite of its simplicity, to clarify why stupidity is so close to and so close to intelligence in fact, whatever its sources: c It is because one puts all one’s intelligence, all one’s reason to reach ends, as much in the action as in the oral and the written one. The relentless logic of the same, that is to say, the logical reason in some of its excesses, can count on the support that brings him the reason mobilized in reaching a target. Or again, the reason that one mobilizes to reach an end can bring logical reason into its excesses or highlight any other form of stupidity.
To support the telos hypothesis, I will go through various typical figures drawn from our culture, known for their kinship or not with the idea of stupidity. I will also draw on real-life cases, if necessary. As comprehensiveness is difficult to achieve here, as stupidity is multifaceted, I will go to the basics to give the hypothesis as much credibility as possible.
BETWEEN WISDOM AND YOUTH
It is by the figure of the wizard that I begin. In a way, it will allow me to mark the point of entry into play.
If there is one figure who keeps his distance from all stupidity, it is that of the wizard. But if this is so, is it not because the wizard has nothing left to pursue, since he has reached wisdom, the ultimate goal of the good life? Of course, wisdom by definition excludes excess as insufficiency in everything. Therefore, the reason for the wizard is perfectly right. He can not thus make excessive use of logical reason. But if the wise man has the fine game of being what he is without a hint of stupidity, it is also because he is self-sufficient, that he does not need, as Comte says. -Sponville, to tell stories — and that counts for a lot if you want to move away from the stupidity — that he is especially without master, because he knows how to live. In other words, he lives constantly in the present without suffering any lack, that is, without having to mobilize his reason in the pursuit of some end. This is how it protects him from stupidity.
But we will probably find the demonstration rather short. However, let us note, in a nod to the detractors of philosophy, that is to say, those who find that philosophers say lots of nonsense, that the key to their contempt is given by the hypothesis of the telos If the philosopher says (or can say so much) nonsense, it is not so much that he is not wise, but that he puts all his efforts towards wisdom!
Anyway, let’s move on to another figure: that of the young. But not the most typical, that is to say, that of the young subject with the usual nonsense of adolescence, which is more akin to carelessness, unconsciousness, and immaturity. Imagine, rather, a young man who aspires to nothing else in life but to “make it run smoothly” and who has the means. Let’s call him Alexander. Every morning, Alexandre has the opportunity to sleep in the morning and never miss it. He does not get up until he is no longer sleepy. Solitary, he eats when needed, without a fixed schedule, and spends his days browsing the internet to distract himself, to walk here and there aimlessly and without worry. If Alexandre knows of particular talents, he has no intention of exploiting them; if he does not know one (let us not forget that we suppose him young), he has no intention of discovering any. In short, he really does little.
However, to live thus close to his most primary biological functions, Alexandre is little exposed to stupidity. His lifestyle may bring him closer to the beast, but he does not confine it to stupidity, as everyone will agree. Even his aspiration to “take it easy”, the only end he aims for, is not likely to make it slip there, because it is not really one: every day, it is carried out. As soon as he wakes up, Alexandre effortlessly manages to lead a lazy life. That said, I still admit that we cannot rule out any risk of stupidity on his part.
But now take into account those who disapprove of his way of life. There are likely to be plenty around him. They tell themselves that Alexander does not lead a life worth living and that he should be protected from himself. To come to an end, they decide to put pressure on Alexander. They start by lecturing him or limit themselves to glaring at him with reproachful looks. But seeing that Alexander remains indifferent to their maneuvers and their attitude of rejection, they embark on a campaign to get the state to take sanctions against anyone who does not seek fulfillment in life. This means they do not really miss a thing!
Now suppose that, under social pressure or for fear of legal sanctions (assuming that these righteous people successfully ran their campaign), Alexander decides to conform to their views, that is to say, to live in accordance with but without adhering to it, without making them his own. He will now lead a life of accomplishment but only in appearance. It is in hiding that he will live idly.
Of course, from the outside, those who were teaching him can only rejoice at his turnaround. Mission accomplished ! they welcome. Perhaps some of them doubt the sincerity of Alexander, but no matter, appearances are saved and, above all, he sets the example. What did they gain in the end? Nothing more than the hypocrisy of Alexander. Have they managed to protect him from himself? Not at all.
This is why we can say, as a first reaction, that their behavior is stupid. Now, let’s analyze this case, first under the hypothesis of immanence. It appears that their stupidity responds to a variant of the logic of the same, based on a universal principle of gender: every human being must seek to be fulfilled. As Alain Roger puts it, the logic of the same can take on other forms, where identity moves on the side of everyone. To that, I would add that what happens more precisely here is the formal principle of justice by treating similar cases in a similar way. As Alexander is a human being and that every human being must seek to accomplish himself, it follows that Alexander must watch over his accomplishment. This logic leaves no room for exceptions: insensitivity, therefore, to the difference that a particular individual case can introduce. But that’s not all. Because if there were only that, the deniers of the way of life of Alexander could remain with their attitude of reprobation, and in this case, their behavior would not hold so much of the stupidity that the narrow-mindedness. Instead, they derive from the universal principle, not only the instantiation “This individual, answering to the name of Alexander, must seek fulfillment”, but also a rule of action like “We must bring people like this Alexander to seek fulfillment”. But it is not entirely in this that their stupidity responds to an impulse that the logic of the same induces in their case. What drives this momentum is in the background: it is the thought that we must protect people like Alexander against themselves. The denigrators of Alexander’s way of life are moved by this rule of protection, especially since they see their right in it: they want the good of Alexander. This gives them a good reason to act. And they can put a lot of intelligence to continue in this way (the way of good). But it is without seeing that their rule of action is doomed to failure in its application since there is an escape by the way of hypocrisy. What’s the point, then, of getting people like Alexander to seek fulfillment? It is in this that their stupidity responds to a momentum induced by the logic of the same.
Compare with the use of a similar rule of action, that of protecting every human being from the nuisance of others. It also rests on a logic of the same, in the sense that we must take care to protect every human being, without exception, the nuisance of others. It also moves us into action when the circumstances are right. But she doesn’t have a basic defect. In principle, this rule is applicable in all cases. Even in extreme cases where the person threatened by others does not want to be intervened, it is possible to successfully apply the rule. The insensitivity to the difference in the context that this implies can be assumed there, in the sense that it does not result from a blindness to the difference in question, but from a consideration which rejects its relevance in the context. This position may be the subject of disagreement, but it is not considered to be stupid as such. On the other hand, if we fail to protect a given person, it is by contingency: insufficiency in the measures taken, delay in their application, insurmountable obstacles, etc. In this case, the end sought by this rule of protection has certainly not been achieved, but it cannot be said that this failure was anticipated.
However, from examining this and Alexander’s case, it should not be inferred that any impetus or effort for a doomed cause is necessarily nonsense. In some desperate situations, it may be worthwhile to fight in vain while knowing it. But these are usually situations where you are hired for a good, indisputable cause and you pay for it in person if you fail.
THE EXTREME FIGURE OF THE INTEGRIST
Note that the denigrators of the way of life of Alexander can be reduced to an extreme variant of the figure of the fundamentalist, that of the fundamentalist convinced of the good to convert, by will or force, the whole humanity to his creed. Its vision of the world rests, of course, on a logic of the same, by its refusal of the diversity of the forms of human life. But it is in the pursuit of the realization of this vision that his extremism is stupid: the efforts he deploys there consist, among other things, of forcibly converting the recalcitrant. We can assume here that this implies threatening the recalcitrant with death if they do not publicly submit to the credo of the integrist or lend themselves to all the rituals incumbent on converts. However, whoever is more than anything in life will submit to this creed and its rituals without being converted to it. The end which the fundamentalist pursues by his proselytism will not be reached, and it is not for want of taking the right means: there is none which ensures the conversion of everyone, and this because there has a vice at the base of the whole company: conversion only makes sense if it is voluntary and freely consented. In other words, this universal conversion project is stupid even before there is a human death, and regardless of this consequence. This is not a case where one could say that the end (universal conversion) justifies the means, in that one does not make an omelet without breaking eggs. It is simply a case of failing instrumental reason: eggs are broken, but the instrument chosen to make the omelet is not one in its very principle, and the other instruments, those suitable for the intended purpose, n ‘’ not one hundred percent guarantee the success of the omelet. What is stupidity here is blindness to the impossibility of the link between the end and the means. It is, therefore, an instrumental stupidity, which only encourages hypocrisy.
There would be nothing unreasonable, insane in the approach of the fundamentalist convinced of the good of the universal conversion to his creed if his approach was limited to the preaching, that is to say, if it resorted to a means in line with the aim. It is not absurd to hope to convert the whole of humanity to its creed, whatever it may be, provided that it does not involve an internal contradiction, as in the case of a code of life prescribing to each one of himself. to be a master to others.
THE FIGURES OF IDENTITY CENTRISM
Let us now consider the following composite figure: that which unites the xenophobe, the sexist and the homophobe. It is recognized today that it is unfair to discriminate against others strictly based on their skin color, ethnic origin, sex or sexual orientation. Where this figure becomes that of stupidity, it is when it is incarnated in the one who remains blind to this injustice not out of sheer malice, but because he draws a kind of exaltation from the most salient features ( color of the skin, ethnic traits, sex, amorous behavior in public) that he perceives in those who are most like him. He sees his fellow-man in others only by the features which he shares with him, and which are most apparent. The glorification it derives takes different forms: in the homophobe, it is the celebration of family values such as procreation, descent, as an absolute embodiment of what would make us worthy of being male or female; in the sexist, it is that of the separation of roles, virility, and femininity; in xenophobia, it is that of its nation, of the “purity” of its origins, or its culture for reasons of supremacy. We see that what takes place at the base of this exaltation is the logic of the same in its abuses: identity to a narrow reference model, identity centrism (ethnocentrism, sexocentrism, heterocentrism). But this extreme glorification can not be what it is only by the exalted effort to emphasize exclusively what results from the most salient features of its group of belonging, or the group for which it feels the stronger membership. This effort is evident in his militant speech. The more we reduce human identity to its outermost elements, the more we must do in a heterogeneous human environment. The stupidity here is to make identity coincide with what is most visible in men and women, when what is less striking about them can be understood as other facets of our humanity, perhaps to be deeper. What stands out most is not necessarily what is most fundamental. The stupidity of the mind that stops at the perception of the most salient and that makes the identity of things.
VANITY & MONKEY
Another figure to examine is that of me-did you see, which brings together the figure of the vain and the boastful. The conceited person is one who, satisfied with himself, spreads this satisfaction, like the privileged person who derives vanity from his wealth. Musil notes that “there has always been a close link between stupidity and vanity”.
As for the boastful, it is one who cannot help but verbally expose his merits in the public square, whether exaggerated or not. For example, proclaiming your intelligence passes for proof of stupidity, especially if you are really intelligent. It is because the intelligence is noticed by its only manifestation. To say it is not redundant, rather it tends to take away a part of itself since a part of intelligence is in know-how and reserve. There is always excess to say that we are intelligent when we really are. If Musil argues that “boastful, talk too much about yourself and boast too much is deemed not only unintelligent, but inappropriate” in the sense that it contravenes the common rules which ensure “the trade of men, in a way, an average temperature”, it seems to me that it is mainly because these ways of speaking about oneself are acts of language or more precisely perlocutionary acts which miss their goal: they want to make recognize something or to induce admiration, but they produce only the laughable and the uneasy. What is nonsense in the vain and boastful is not the order of a logic of the same push to excess, but a gap between the effect they aim to produce in others and the real effect they produce on the latter without realizing it after the fact. The vain and the boastful persist and sign, but what they sign is not what they think they are signing in the eyes of others. This is another case of failing instrumental reason, where the intended target is missed not by bad luck or contingency, but by the very means used.
Finally, let’s turn our attention to a final figure, that of the upstart. Theater and cinema never fail to show stupidity.
The parvenu is the one who apes the habits, the tastes, the chic, the savoir-vivre of the elite. However, his stupidity is not in the ostentatious accumulation of luxury goods identical to those of his model, nor in the spectacle, he gives of his person whom he wants to put on and like his model; it is in this effort, always doomed to failure, that it puts to resemble its model by said accumulation and said spectacle. He wants to appropriate the way of life of the elite, but he can only appropriate the replicas of his luxury goods. Classically dressed, the parvenu remains disguised. The care he takes to comply with the privileged identity fails to achieve refinement and elegance. His mimicry is not that of a bad imitator or a failed imitator, but of a blind imitator who cannot make his roots forgotten. Denying his origins, he can not choose to bridge them and his new status and thus find to assume, especially in front of others, the authenticity and originality of his journey. Foolishness of one who wants to impersonate another by trying to rewrite his own story.
CONCLUSION
As I hope I have shown, the telos hypothesis complements the immanence hypothesis to more fully account for several aspects of stupidity. Even if born of reason, stupidity is not immediately born due to the natural hostility of its environment, or at least is not the victim of sudden death syndrome. What keeps her alive is that momentum that thought finds in the pursuit of ends. Just like the logic of the same in its excesses, the frantic pursuit of ends can precipitate the most rational of minds in stupidity. Stupidity is not made by brainless people, but by well-filled heads that give in obstinacy, as Montaigne saw.
The finality, which is the fundamental characteristic of human action, acts on us as a kind of exhortation to take the means to achieve the end sought. Instrumental reason is therefore strongly solicited. Its imperative logic is that of the obligation of result. In practice, this logic opens the door to excess, which is the essential characteristic of stupidity. As Alain Roger points out: “the stupidity lies less in the conclusion (which can be founded) than in the will to produce it at any cost and to meet it peremptorily”.This is what Flaubert said about stupidity, namely, that it “consists in wanting to conclude”. The will to conclude is not only proper to say, but also to do in the pursuit of an end. If logical reason, by its sufficiency, can push us to stupidity, the reason mobilized in the reaching of an end can, as for it, we draw there. It is not that it derails, but rather that it is like mounted on rails and thus loses its capacity to rectify its aim according to the nature of the ground. It can only progress to one possible destination.
In the end, stupidity is doubly ineliminable, since it is immanent not only in logical reason, from which the sensible man cannot separate, but also in instrumental reason, mobilized in the pursuit of ends from which he cannot escape. The ultimate in stupidity would be to aim for its elimination.
